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THE WAGES OF GENETIC ENTITLEMENT:
THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY IN THE
RAPE SURVIVOR CHILD CUSTODY ACT
Jennifer S. Hendricks
ABSTRACT—This Essay analyzes flaws and assumptions in the recently
enacted Rape Survivor Child Custody Act. The RSCCA offers a window
into the problems with defining parenthood in terms of genes instead of
caretaking relationships, which is what led to the problem of rapists being
able to claim parental rights in the first place. Rather than address that
underlying defect in family law, the statute attempts a solution that might
work if all rapists were strangers, all rapists were men, and all rape victims
were women, but glosses over complicated problems of violence and
coercion in relationships. Despite this failure to grapple with hard cases, the
RSCCA helps us see how the biological processes of reproduction are
necessarily intertwined with the definition of legal parenthood.
AUTHOR—Jennifer S. Hendricks, Professor of Law, University of
Colorado Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
Should rapists have parental rights?
As society and law have increasingly equated genetic parenthood with
parental rights, this question has become surprisingly difficult, so difficult
that it eventually merited a response from Congress. That response—the
Rape Survivor Child Custody Act (RSCCA)1—has serious flaws but sheds
revealing light on what women’s and men’s different roles in reproduction
should mean for law.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that constitutionally protected
parental rights to a child do not spring solely from genetic parenthood—
“[t]hey require relationships more enduring.”2 Taking the birth mother as
its archetypal parent, the Court saw in her two key elements of legal
parenthood: genetic parenthood, yes, but also physical care and nurturance.
The pregnant woman provides that care through the process of gestation.
Since men cannot do the same, the Court accommodated them by
fashioning a different test: genetic fatherhood plus caretaking of the sort
men can perform. “Genetics plus relationship” is thus the test for when men
acquire constitutionally protected parental rights.3
Despite the Supreme Court’s inclusion of caretaking as part of the test,
every state gives men some form of genetic entitlement to their offspring,
even when “relationships more enduring” do not exist.4 That is, in a broad
range of circumstances, a man who is a genetic father, but has no other
connection to the child, can claim parental rights.
Perhaps the most extreme manifestation of this regime of genetic
entitlement is the ability of male rapists to obtain parental rights to the

1

34 U.S.C.A. §§ 21301–08 (West 2017) (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14043h–1403h-7).
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397
(1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
3
For a more detailed explication of the development of this test, see Jennifer S. Hendricks,
Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 433 (2007).
4
I discuss this disconnect between the Supreme Court’s definition of constitutional parenthood and
the broad substantive rights afforded to genetic fathers by the states in Jennifer S. Hendricks, Fathers
and Feminism: The Case Against Genetic Entitlement, 91 TUL. L. REV. 473, 485–90 (2017). States
allow a man to petition for paternity “and will grant the petition under most circumstances so long as
genetic fatherhood is shown.” Id. at 487; see Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part I,
Disestablishing the Paternity of Non-Marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 35 (2003) (noting that paternity
proceedings driven by genetic testing are required for receipt of certain federal funds all states have
enacted laws to comply with that requirement).
2
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children that result from their crimes. In one of the more egregious cases, a
Massachusetts judge ordered a convicted rapist to establish paternity,
apparently in the belief that suing his victim for parental rights would be a
good way for him to take responsibility for his crime.5 The ability to sue for
paternity can also serve as a tool for rapists to continue controlling their
victims, such as by offering to drop the paternity suit in exchange for the
victim dropping her criminal complaint.6 A successful paternity suit lays
the groundwork for seeking custody or visitation, as well as the right to
participate in making important decisions on behalf of the child.7
Legal scholarship on this problem has so far been limited to student
papers, including one by Shauna Prewitt, an activist who championed
legislative restrictions on rapists’ rights after her own experience of being
sued by her rapist for visitation rights to her child.8 Responding to this
activism, Congress enacted the Rape Survivor Child Custody Act, which
offers modest grants to states that have in place:
a law that allows the mother of any child that was conceived through rape to
seek court-ordered termination of the parental rights of her rapist with regard
to that child, which the court is authorized to grant upon clear and convincing
evidence of rape.9

Although a few states had such laws before the RSCCA was enacted,
others required a criminal conviction of rape to trigger termination of
parental rights, and most had only generic rules for parental “unfitness.”10
The RSCCA encourages all states to make conception-by-rape an explicit,
statutory basis for termination of a father’s parental rights, under the clearand-convincing standard rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
5

Liz Fields, These Women Became Pregnant From Rape, Then Fought Their Attackers for
Custody, VICE NEWS (Dec. 1, 2014, 2:35 PM), https://news.vice.com/article/these-women-becamepregnant-from-rape-then-fought-their-attackers-for-custody [https://perma.cc/KM24-ZPHA].
6
See 34 U.S.C.A, § 21302 (West 2017) (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C.A. § 14043h-1) (congressional
findings stating this reason for enacting the RSCCA).
7
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (describing “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”).
8
Shauna R. Prewitt, Giving Birth to a “Rapist’s Child”: A Discussion and Analysis of the Limited
Legal Protections Afforded to Women Who Become Mothers Through Rape, 98 GEO. L.J. 827 (2010);
see also Kara N. Bitar, The Parental Rights of Rapists, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 275 (2012);
Rachael Kessler, Due Process and Legislation Designed to Restrict the Rights of Rapist Fathers,
10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 199 (2015); Moriah Silver, The Second Rape: Legal Options for Rape
Survivors to Terminate Parental Rights, 48 FAM. L.Q. 515 (2014); Margot E. H. Stevens, Rape-Related
Pregnancies: The Need to Create Stronger Protections for the Victim-Mother and Child, 65 HASTINGS
L.J. 865 (2014); Katherine E. Wendt, How States Reward Rape: An Agenda to Protect the RapeConceived Child Through the Termination of Parental Rights, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1763 (2013).
9
34 U.S.C.A. § 21303 (West 2017).
10
Prewitt, supra note 8, at 853–59.
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The RSCCA offers a window into the problems with defining
parenthood in terms of genes instead of caretaking relationships. As I have
argued elsewhere, the genetic definition of parenthood is patriarchal: it
degrades female-specific experiences of parenthood and grounds parental
rights in property-like entitlements rather than in actual, lived relationships
with children.11 Rejecting it entails recognizing that women and men are
differently situated with respect to their newborn offspring, a proposition
that the Supreme Court has acknowledged as self-evident but which many
feminists resist for fear of reinforcing stereotypes.12 To those feminists, I
offer the RSCCA as a test case for whether the parental rights that attach to
giving birth to a child ought to differ from the rights that attach to
contributing the sperm. The gaps and implicit assumptions of the RSCCA
show that sex differences matter in the definition of parenthood.
This Essay discusses the good, the bad, and the ugly of the RSCCA.
Altering the usual order, it starts with the bad, which is that the RSCCA
accepts the premise of genetic entitlement to children. Then, the good:
Despite its failure to grapple with the underlying problem of genetic
entitlement, the RSCCA helps us see how the biological processes of
reproduction are necessarily intertwined with the definition of legal
parenthood. Congress’s treatment of the relationship between rape and
parenthood provides a starting point for reassessing the genetic entitlement
regime, and, hopefully, moving to a different regime based on caretaking
relationships. Finally, the Essay turns to an ugly reality that the RSCCA
elides: even in a regime in which rights are based on caretaking rather than
on genetic entitlement, sometimes rapists have—and should have—
parental rights.
I.

THE BAD: ACCEPTING THE PREMISE OF GENETIC ENTITLEMENT

The RSCCA responds to a problem that should not exist in the first
place. The Supreme Court has rejected the claim that genetic paternity
alone gives rise to constitutionally protected parental rights.13 States have
nonetheless created regimes of genetic entitlement, which open the door to
rapists’ paternity claims. The RSCCA, unfortunately, implicitly accepts this
regime by treating genetic fathers as presumptively entitled to parental
rights.14
11

See, e.g., Jennifer S. Hendricks, Genetic Essentialism in Family Law, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 109
(2016) (discussing other ways the biological facts of reproduction could be interpreted through law and
culture).
12
See, e.g., Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and Fathers, 41 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 645, 690–92 (2014) (discussing feminist concerns about the “new maternalism” that
constructs “motherhood as a source of pride and moral authority for women”) (quoting Naomi Mezey &
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Against the New Maternalism, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 229, 233 (2012)).
13
See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
14
Karen Czapanskiy discusses this problem in the context of analyzing a failed mini-RSCCA in
Maryland. Karen Czapanskiy, Stanley v. Illinois: Terminating a Rapist’s Paternal ‘Rights’ in
Maryland, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 2, 2017), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2017/06/
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Consider how the RSCCA applies to cases of “real rape,” or as we
might call it today, “legitimate rape”: the stranger-with-a-knife scenario.15
In this scenario, the pregnant victim who decides to bear and keep the baby
will have sole custody from birth.16 The rapist will have no opportunity to
form a relationship with the child; therefore, under Supreme Court
precedent, he will have no constitutional parental rights. Rather than
reaffirming the Supreme Court’s test for fathers’ rights, the RSCCA
assumes that, absent special legislation, genes alone entitle the rapist to sue
for paternity. Although the RSCCA seeks to provide the mother with a
defense to that paternity suit, it confirms and thereby strengthens the
background assumption of genetic entitlement.
Only because the states have adopted a shallow and patriarchal theory
of parental “equality” based on genes is there even a question of the rapist
being able to claim parental rights. These are the wages of genetic
entitlement: the clearest problem with the RSCCA is that it takes genetic
entitlement as a given. Rather than take advantage of Supreme Court
precedent, which would prevent a rapist from gaining parental rights due to
the absence of a relationship with the child, the RSCCA requires a woman
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that her child was conceived
from rape, all to obtain the custody to which she should be constitutionally
entitled.
II. THE GOOD: RECOGNIZING MOTHERS’ RIGHTS
There is nonetheless one type of rapist who nearly always has
constitutionally protected parental rights. Indeed, even under an RSCCA
regime, there will still be one way for a rapist to ensure parental rights to a
child conceived through rape: by giving birth to the child.
The RSCCA is conspicuously sex-specific. It protects only women
and protects them only from paternity claims by men.17 Yet women
sometimes commit rape, of both the statutory and the forcible kind, and
stanley-v-illinois-terminating-a-rapists-paternal-rights-in-maryland.html
[https://perma.cc/BVT2G7JS].
15
The phrase “real rape” is sarcastic and comes from SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987), in
which Estrich argues that this archetypal form of rape is used to trivialize and discount the experiences
of marital rape, date rape, and other non-archetypal rapes. “Legitimate rape” became famous after it was
used (unsarcastically) by Representative Todd Akin to claim that women could not become pregnant
through “legitimate rape.” Lori Moore, Rep. Todd Akin: The Statement and the Reaction, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/us/politics/rep-todd-akin-legitimate-rapestatement-and-reaction.html [https://perma.cc/VD98-NJN4].
16
If she is married, state law may automatically presume her spouse to be the child’s other legal
parent. If she is single, she will be the only legal parent until there is a successful paternity suit, an
adoption, or a Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity signed by her and another person.
17
34 U.S.C.A. § 21303 (West 2017).
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they sometimes become pregnant as a result. If the point of the RSCCA
were that all rapists are unfit to parent, it would apply to mothers as well as
fathers. And if the point of the RSCCA were that all rape victims should be
able to keep and rear their resulting children without interference from their
rapists, it would apply to fathers as well as mothers.
What, then, is the point? The sex-specificity of the RSCCA is clearly
related to its focus on protecting the woman, rather than on serving the
child’s best interests. While I will argue below that it is wrong to ignore
best interests when a relationship exists between the father and the child,
when no such relationship exists, the mother’s rights are both paramount
and sorely neglected in the current parenthood regimes in the states. The
focus on the mother’s rights is a feature, not a bug of the RSCCA. It
recognizes that awarding parental rights to a genetic father inherently
diminishes the preexisting parental rights of the woman who gave birth to
the child. As the Supreme Court recognized in Troxel v. Granville,18 a
single parent has the same right as married parents to avoid having the state
impose an unwelcome adult on her family.
Male and female rapists’ parental rights are, and should be,
asymmetric because biological parenthood is asymmetric.19 Consider, as
illustration, the difference between the RSCCA and the law’s treatment of
male victims who become fathers by rape. Debate over the latter comes up
mostly in the context of statutory rape and focuses exclusively on whether
the male victim should be required to pay child support.20 In this literature,
I cannot find a single commenter proposing that the father should instead
receive automatic custody of the child. On the contrary, female rapists
routinely retain custody of the resulting children.21
Imagine if the RSCCA took this approach, reassuring a pregnant rape
victim that her rapist will take custody of the child immediately after birth,
and that she will not have to pay child support. That, of course, is absurd.
Why? One could argue that the asymmetry here is purely the result of
stereotypes. We essentialize women as mothers, so when we see the female
18

530 U.S. 57 (2000).
See Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male Victims of Statutory
Rape Pay Child Support for Children Resulting From Their Victimization? 36 GA. L. REV. 411, 443
(2002) (“The law treats mothers and fathers differently, not because of intentional discrimination, but
rather due to the reality of sex and gender differences that cannot be eradicated by gender-neutral
laws.”).
20
See, e.g., id.; Michael J. Higdon, Fatherhood by Conscription: Nonconsensual Insemination and
the Duty of Child Support, 46 GA. L. REV. 407 (2012).
21
See Jones, supra note 19, at 435 (“It is unlikely that a female offender will lose custody or have
to prove that she is a fit parent of any child resulting from statutory rape . . . . Unlike male offenders, the
age of the mother does not alert authorities that this might be a case of statutory rape, and their role in
the birth process means the state must act to remove physical custody from the mother.”). Jones
describes cases in which women gave birth from statutory rape and received welfare benefits; the states
sought reimbursement of the welfare payments from the fathers but apparently took no action
challenging the mothers’ custody. Higdon, supra note 20, at 409–10 describes a similar scenario
involving an adult man who alleged he was raped while unconscious.
19
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teacher who became pregnant by her fourteen-year-old pupil, her motherness trumps her criminality. Those stereotypes almost certainly explain, at
least in part, why courts have traditionally been willing to impose child
support obligations on male victims of statutory rape: courts did not see
those boys as victims.22
But in a world of perfect sex equality, would we have to treat male
and female victims and perpetrators of rape identically when it comes to
custody of the resulting children? If so, which rule should apply? Should
female rape victims hand their babies over to their rapists, or should male
victims be expected to take custody by default? I submit that either option
is absurd because the two situations remain crucially different. Regardless
of who raped whom, the mother’s parental relationship exists at the time of
birth in a way that a man’s does not, at least if his only involvement was
the early transmission of genetic material. Imposing a rapist father on his
victim and child is a clear wrong in a way that allowing a female rapist to
keep her child is not.
III. THE UGLY: SOMETIMES, RAPISTS (SHOULD) HAVE PARENTAL RIGHTS
The flip side of distinguishing between the mother’s existing
relationship with the child and the father’s mere contribution of genes is
that we must also distinguish between the father who has only contributed
genes and the father who has, in fact, established a caretaking relationship
with the child. Unfortunately, the RSCCA ignores the possibility of such a
relationship, implicitly assuming the “real rape” scenario. The statute fails
to grapple with the complications that arise when the father is a rapist but
not a stranger.23
Consider a non-“real rape” scenario: An opposite-sex couple has an
ongoing sexual relationship. Sometimes the mother consents to sex and
sometimes she does not. They have a child, whom they proceed to raise
22

Jones, supra note 19, at 412 (“[S]tatutory rape laws are being enforced according to cultural
stereotypes of women as sexual victims and men as sexual aggressors.”).
23
In its findings, Congress declared:
(8) A rapist pursuing parental or custody rights forces the survivor to have
continued interaction with the rapist, which can have traumatic psychological
effects on the survivor, and can make it more difficult for her to recover.
(9) These traumatic effects on the mother can severely negatively impact her
ability to raise a healthy child.
(10) Rapists may use the threat of pursuing custody or parental rights to
coerce survivors into not prosecuting rape, or otherwise harass, intimidate, or
manipulate them.
34 U.S.C.A. § 21302 (West 2017). All of these concerns seem to contemplate a dispute over a recently
born child who has been in the sole custody of her mother. Nowhere does Congress appear to expressly
contemplate allegations of rape within an ongoing family.
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together. Years later, they separate and a custody fight ensues. The judge
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child was conceived in an
instance of rape and terminates the father’s rights.
Is that a good outcome? Is it a constitutional one? The father in this
scenario has a constitutionally protected relationship with the child.
Traditionally, that relationship can only be terminated if clear and
convincing evidence shows him to be an unfit parent.24 While the
congressional findings in the RSCCA argue that the law is constitutional
because it adopts the clear-and-convincing standard,25 that argument
ignores the critical question: clear and convincing evidence of what? A
state cannot just declare that anyone who jaywalks must lose parental
rights, as long as jaywalking is shown by clear and convincing evidence.
Of course, having committed rape is more relevant to parental
fitness than jaywalking.26 Perhaps the RSCCA takes the rape to be
conclusive evidence of unfitness. If so, the Act would be a significant
expansion of the grounds for automatic or near-automatic termination of
parental rights. In defining unfitness, termination law focuses on the
parent’s conduct toward his own children.27 Courts have overwhelmingly
held that the bare fact of having committed a crime is not enough to find
unfitness; a court must always inquire into the particular facts of the
incident.28 Under this approach, courts have declined to find unfit a father
who murdered his children’s mother, a father who engaged in lewd and
lascivious conduct with a minor not his child, and a mother who sexually
tortured the father’s ex-wife.29 In a case terminating the rights of a father
who stabbed the mother, another court nonetheless emphasized that
termination was not based on the mere fact of that crime’s presence on the
rap sheet, because “the murder of one parent by the other is not necessarily
a felony showing the felonious parent to be unfit to have custody and
control.”30
24

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 n.10 (1982) (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,
255 (1978)).
25
34 U.S.C.A. § 21302 (West 2017) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).
26
My point in using jaywalking as my example is not to minimize the relevance of rape but to
illustrate the inadequacy of Congress’s legal reasoning on this point.
It is also notable that the RSCCA fails to provide a definition of “rape.” Anecdotally, based on
Colorado’s version of the RSCCA, it appears that a large portion of the cases in which the rule is
invoked are cases of statutory rape. It is not clear that the bare fact of having committed statutory rape
makes a man an unfit parent, or makes termination of any existing parental relationship in the best
interests of the child.
27
See Jana Micek, Termination of Parental Rights Based on a Felony Conviction, 1 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 565, 566–68 (2000) (collecting cases); Deborah Ahrens, Not in Front of the Children:
Prohibition on Child Custody as Civil Branding for Criminal Activity, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 737 (2000)
(arguing against making loss of child custody a collateral consequence of conviction when the
underlying crime does not indicate a threat to the child).
28
See Micek, supra note 27, at 566–68.
29
Id.
30
In re Arthur C., 176 Cal. App. 3d 442, 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Micek, supra note 27, at 567.
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In fact, the RSCCA does not itself adopt the view that committing
rape is per se proof of parental unfitness, or even that rape of the mother
always warrants termination of the father’s rights. Rather, under the
RSCCA, the only rape that matters is a rape by the father that led to the
conception of the child.31 Rapes by the mother do not matter. Rapes of
other people by the father do not matter. Other rapes of the mother by the
father do not matter. Rape that led to the conception of one child does not
matter as to custody of other children. A woman who proves that she was
regularly raped by her husband or boyfriend but cannot prove the instance
of conception, for each child, has no recourse under the statute.
The RSCCA’s failure to grapple with children conceived within
ongoing relationships reveals its implicit adoption of the “real rape”
prototype, neglecting complexity in favor of a quick fix for the easiest
cases. By ignoring cases in which a man has a long-standing relationship
with his child conceived through rape, the RSCCA encourages states to
enact laws that will be unconstitutional in many potential applications.
Drafters of the RSCCA may have been aware that the Act was
pushing states onto this constitutional thin ice. The original version of the
bill required that termination of the father’s parental rights be mandatory,
once rape is shown by clear and convincing evidence.32 In the enacted
version, “the court shall” was changed to “the court is authorized,” which
leaves some unspecified range for judicial discretion.33 This lack of
specificity created confusion in the implementation of the statute: could a
court, having found that rape led to conception, consider the child’s best
interests in deciding whether to terminate the father’s rights? The
Department of Justice initially took the informal position that the child’s
best interests could not be considered once rape was shown.34 A few weeks
later, the Department informally backtracked, stating that consideration of
the child’s best interests “may” be allowed under the RSCCA.35
Mandatory termination, as in the earlier draft of the RSCCA, is
favored by advocates like Prewitt, who has argued that mandatory
termination, with no discretion to consider the child’s best interests, is the

31

34 U.S.C.A. § 21303 (West 2017).
Compare 34 U.S.C.A. § 21303 (West 2017) (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C.A. § 1403h-2) (“the
court is authorized to grant”) with H.R. 1257, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015) (“the court shall grant”).
33
34 U.S.C.A. § 21303 (West 2017).
34
Email from U.S. Department of Justice to state administrators, “Rape Survivor Child Custody
Act,” (Feb. 18, 2016) (on file with the author).
35
Office on Violence Against Women, U.S. Department of Justice, PowerPoint: Implementation of
the Rape Survivor Child Custody Act of 2015 (Mar. 30, 2016) (on file with the author).
32
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only acceptable rule.36 In cases where the father and child have a
longstanding relationship, this disregard for the child’s best interests is in
some tension with the pro-life tenor of Prewitt’s advocacy,37 but ruling out
a best-interests analysis makes sense in a “real rape” scenario. In that
scenario, the rapist does not (yet) have a parental relationship with the
child, but judges may believe that an involved genetic father is always in
the child’s best interests.38 The statutory mandate serves as a backstop
against that attitude. But when an established relationship exists, the
father’s constitutional rights demand clear and convincing evidence not
merely of an enumerated crime but of unfitness, and the child’s moral
rights demand consideration of her best interests.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the state laws encouraged by the RSCCA are either
unnecessary or unconstitutional: Where the genetic father has not yet
established a parental relationship with the child, there is no need to
terminate what does not exist; rather than reinforce the genetic
presumption, Congress should encourage states to use the caretaking prong
of the Supreme Court’s test for fathers’ rights. And where a caretaking
relationship already exists, it should be respected according to its merits.
Despite those flaws, however, there is good news in the RSCCA’s
recognition that biological mothers and biological fathers are differently
situated in ways that have legitimate consequences for legal determinations
about parental rights.

36

Prewitt, supra note 8, at 854–58 (describing existing protections for rape-victim mothers as
“illusory” if they require conviction for the rape or are subject to a judicial best-interests-of-the-child
determination).
37
Prewitt says that rape victims who have abortions are “demonstrat[ing] their disdain for their
unborn children.” Id. at 853.
38
Judges (and others) may also be skeptical of a woman’s rape allegations when she decides to
keep the baby. Prewitt argues that society expects rape victims to view their pregnancies as
continuations of the rape and judges them harshly if they fail to resort to emergency contraception,
abortion, or adoption. Id. Similarly, Rebecca Kiesling, a Michigan family lawyer, told Vice Magazine
that she has been involved in several cases in which rape victims lost partial custody to their rapists, an
outcome she attributes to the assumption that “a ‘real’ rape victim would have had an abortion.” Fields,
supra note 5.
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